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AFTERWORD: KNOWLEDGE AND ANSWERS
Frank H. Easterbrook*
All very well, but can you prove it? If you do not have conclusive
proof, we shall go on as before.
Edmund Burke would have approved the sentiment. Many lawyers
and legal academics share it. They point out that economists often disagree, that economic methods rarely produce eternal verities or even
demonstrably "right" answers.' As Mark Kelman observes in this Symposium, economic inquiry presupposes some set of entitlements, institutional arrangements, and rules for trading. There is very little in
Kelman's critique-except its conclusion-to which Adam Smith would
have taken exception. The author of The Theory of Moral Sentiments did
not think that economics was, should, or could be determinate or value2
free.
Yet there is a curious inversion of argument at work. Burke questioned the invocation of abstractions and ideals to upset the collective
wisdom of political society. Economic analysis of law by and large seeks
not to upset but to understand the legal system and the activities that
the system regulates. Economists, like anthropologists, suspect that
any arrangement that persists for many years among many people must
be doing something good. Why else does it survive? Regularities of all
sorts-the basic rules of negligence, the doctrine of consideration, the
practice of tie-in sales-rest on something more significant than passing fancy or mistake.
What do these doctrines and business practices do? These are the
questions with which economic analysis starts. The observation that
economic analysis cannot answer these questions with certainty does
not lead to the conclusion that lawyers and judges are free to upset the
practices based on intuition and political philosophy. The invocation
of philosophic ideals as grounds of change was the target of Burke's
original criticism. Economic analysis has supplied a new name-the
Nirvana Fallacy, the belief that if a given practice is costly or imperfect
then some alternative must be better-for a very old idea. It is always
well to improve the state of economic knowledge; it is always necessary
* Judge, United States Court otfAppeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago.
1. Compare Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617 (1973), and Kennedy, CostBenefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1981), with
Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal
Entitlements, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1169 (1984).
2. See G. Stigler, The Economist as Preacher, and Other Essays 3-13 (1982); accord R. Coase, How Should Economists Choose? (1982).
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to remember that the difficulties in obtaining knowledge do not justify
actions based on unexamined intuitions and utopian theories.
Much of this Symposium is about the process of testing the limits
of knowledge. What can we say with certainty? With confidence? The
exchange between Daniel Rubinfeld and Richard Lempert shows both
the methods and hazards of drawing conclusions through the application of econometric techniques in litigation. The exchange between
Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, and Mark Kelman, shows both
the methods and hazards of drawing conclusions about how bargaining
proceeds. The papers by Alvin Klevorick, George Fletcher, Susan
Rose-Ackerman, and Richard Epstein test our ability to draw conclusions about legal rules through the arguments and data now available.
It is no surprise that questions dominate answers even in empirical
work. Professional economics, like other sciences, proceeds very
slowly. Someone formulates a new hypothesis. If the hypothesis appears to offer a congenial way to organize observations about some
slice of the world, economists may embrace it. Among those who do,
some will design tests. This empirical work will be presented at seminars and other professional gatherings, subjected to the scrutiny of
referees selected from the best in the profession, and perhaps will be
published. Other economists will endeavor to tear it apart. After several iterations of this cycle, the profession may accept the answer or it
may consign the problem to the list of anomolies to be dealt with by
some future development in theory.
The cycle of posing questions, offering and altering answers,
moves far too slowly to answer questions as they arise in litigation. We
still do not know the answers to such fundamental questions as "does
capital punishment deter murder more effectively than life imprison'4
ment without possibility of parole? ' 3 and "do seat belts save lives?"
Although Professors Rubinfeld and Lempert observe that empirical
methods may offer much knowledge about particular litigable issues, it
is important to distinguish knowledge from answers.
The gap between questions and knowledge, on one hand, and answers, on the other, is not peculiar to economics. Biochemists cannot
yet answer the question "does saccharin cause cancer in people?" Engineering and physics cannot tell us with certainty whether the hazards
of using nuclear reactors to make electricity exceed those of burning
coal to make electricity. Anytime a science must deal with a very com3. Compare Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of
Life and Death, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 397 (1975), with Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin, Summary of Report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, in 6J.
Crim.Just. 1 (1978).
4. Compare Crandall & Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 328 (1984),
with Petzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 677
(1975).
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plex system-whether the body or the economy-a large gap will exist
between knowledge and answers. The political and judicial arms of
government nonetheless must give answers. Lawyers must settle on
answers to questions that have no right answers.
Economic analysis helps people shape questions to take maximum
advantage of scarce knowledge. If lawyers and judges start from
scratch in wrestling with a problem, they will be driven to consult their
intuitions for answers. Do rules restraining alienation help or hurt the
poor? Does a ban on resale price maintenance help or hurt customers?
Unless there is some way to break the questions down into manageable
parts, on each of which there is some knowledge, the lawyer might as
well consult Tarot cards.
The discipline of economics instructs people that to understand
the effects of a rule they must evaluate the rule's influence on marginal
incentives rather than the rule's average consequences. It shows why
we should ask questions ex ante rather than ex post. It teaches people
to respect the ability of markets to capture the information of all traders
and thus to create wisdom more profound than any actor possesses individually. 5 Economic approaches suggest sources of knowledge that
may otherwise be overlooked. Though knowledge is scarce, it does exist, and a new approach to old questions may enable us to use and generalize from the knowledge we possess. The contributions to this
Symposium continue the effort to break down unanswerable questions
into manageable parts and to bring more knowledge to bear in the
search for plausible responses to intractable problems.
5. See T. Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions (1980); Easterbrook, The Supreme

Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
4, 8-18 (1984).
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